This paper studies the effects of the diversification of energy portfolios on the merit order effect in an oligopolistic energy market. The merit order effect describes the negative impact of renewable energy, typically supplied at the low marginal cost, to the electricity market. We show when thermal generators have a diverse energy portfolio, meaning that they also control some or all of the renewable supplies, they offset the price declines due to the merit order effect because they strategically reduce their conventional energy supplies when renewable supply is high. In particular, when all renewable supply generates profits for only thermal power generators this offset is complete -meaning that the merit order effect is totally neutralized. As a consequence, diversified energy portfolios may be welfare reducing. These results are robust to the presence of forward contracts and incomplete information (with or without correlated types). We further use our full model with incomplete information to study the volatility of energy prices in the presence of intermittent and uncertain renewable supplies.
INTRODUCTION
With mounting concerns over climate change caused by fossil fuels, there has been growing reliance on renewable energy.
1 Currently, 67 countries, including all EU countries, have renewable energy policy targets, mandating electricity companies to provide a minimal fraction of total electricity supply from renewables. In the United States, for example, this target is set to grow to 20% by 2020, while it is 33% in the UK and also 20% in the European Union. These targets have motivated many conventional (thermal) energy companies to seek a diversified energy portfolio and increase their investments in renewable supply. The European energy giant Alstom has thus concluded: "A diverse energy portfolio is the only sound business and policy strategy able to address any Energy & Climate scenario" (Lalwani and Khoo (2013) ). Though the high setup costs of renewable plants are often subsidized by public funds (U.S. Energy Information Administration (2013)), they are argued to benefit the economy not just by reducing fossil fuel emissions but also extreme case where all of the supply of renewables comes in the form of such diversified energy portfolios (meaning that it is supplied by the same conventional energy companies), the MoE is fully neutralized, and greater renewable supplies, or more favorable realization of renewable supply outcomes, have no impact on equilibrium energy prices.
Our baseline and simplest model uses the standard Cournot oligopolistic competition setup to establish the partial or full neutralization of the MoE. The main economic force leading to this result is that diversified producers have an incentive to offset the price declines due to the MoE by reducing their conventional energy supplies. The greater is the supply of renewables, the stronger is this incentive. This force is related to the strategic substitutes property of Cournot competition, inducing suppliers to cut production when the supply of renewables is high. But crucially, this incentive is exacerbated because diversified energy companies take into account the loss of profits from their own renewable supplies that would result in the absence of such a cut.
We then enrich this baseline model to incorporate two important features of energy markets: forward contracts, and correlated imperfectly observed shocks to geographically proximate renewable energy suppliers. Forward contracts play a central role in many energy markets, both because of private parties' incentives to hedge pricing risk and because of regulations mandating forward contracts for generators. 3 We analyze forward contracts by adapting the seminal work of Allaz and Vila (1993) , who demonstrated that forward contracts lead to lower equilibrium prices in oligopolistic markets. We show that our main results on the partial and full neutralization of the MoE applies in the presence of forward contracts in exactly the same fashion as in our baseline model.
Our full model incorporates both forward contracts and correlated, imperfectly observed shocks. We model this latter feature by assuming that renewable energy supplies in similar geographic areas are subject to locally correlated variability, and that each firm only observes its own realization of renewable supply, but is aware of the structure of local correlation. We are not aware of any other work in the literature developing a tractable model of incomplete information Cournot equilibrium with forward contracts and renewable energy. The incomplete information Cournot equilibrium in this case again shows the neutralization of the MoE. In addition, this version of the model enables us to study the implications of renewable supply on price volatility. Focusing on spatial configurations in which the correlation of renewable supply decays according to distance across plants, we show that the spot price volatility increases as the distance among renewable plants increases. This is because when renewable plants are far apart so that there is less correlation among renewable supply, they create more miscoordination in supplies, increasing price volatility. Using this intuition, we further show that among all geographic configurations with "regular" structures, the maximum price volatility occurs when renewable plants have a "ring" structure and the minimum price volatility arises in geographic configurations exhibiting a "complete" structure.
Finally, we study the profit and welfare implications of diversified renewable portfolios. Intuitively, diversified energy portfolios are beneficial for thermal producers, but detrimental for consumers. Most importantly, the negative effect on consumers resulting from higher markups dominates, and overall welfare declines with greater diversification.
4. See also Yao, Adler and Oren (2008) ; Downward, Zakeri and Philpott (2010) ; Bose et al. (2014) for other applications of the Cournot model in electricity markets. See also Bigerna, Bollino and Polinori (2016) that empirically measures market power by explicitly disentangling this from the impact of network congestion on market structure and equilibrium prices in the Italian electricity market.
Literature
This work is related to the literature on energy market and oligopoly pricing. Generally, there are two ways of modeling energy markets (Joskow (2001) , Borenstein (2002) ): pooling market and bilateral trades. In a pooling market, all the energy producers sell their produced energy to a centrally operated pool, and then all the energy customers buy from the pool. In contrast, in a bilateral trade producers and customers deal separately and then inform the independent system operator that they have agreed to a transaction.
The main approaches to run pooling markets are based on the supply function equilibrium (SFE) model and the Cournot competition. In the SFE each producer submits a supply function to a system operator, who will set a uniform market clearing price, as a result producers compete both in quantity and price. This model was first developed by Klemperer and Meyer (1989) , and later applied in the wholesale electricity markets by Green and Newbery (1992) ; Rudkevich, Duckworth and Rosen (1998) ; Baldick and Hogan (2002) ; Baldick, Grant and Kahn (2004) . In the Cournot model, instead of a supply function, each producer simply bids its desired production amount, and the market price is determined to clear the market given consumer demand. The Cournot setup is a good approximation to several energy markets, including California's electricity industry (Borenstein et al. (1995) ; ; Borenstein, Bushnell and Knittel (1999) ), New Zealand's electricity markets (Scott and Read (1996) ), and congestion pricing in transmission networks (Hogan (1997); Oren (1997) ). 4 Ventosa, Baill and Rivier (2005) and Willems, Rumiantseva and Weigt (2009) have detailed discussions about the pros and cons of Cournot and SFE models. In particular, Willems, Rumiantseva and Weigt (2009) have tested both models using the dataset of Germany's electricity market. Their results indicate the calibrated SFE and Cournot models perform almost equally well, and on the basis of this, these authors suggest the use of Cournot models for short-term analysis and the SFE models for long-term analysis.
There is also a literature in engineering, studying the introduction of renewable supply in electricity markets (e.g. Meyn et al. (2010) ; Varaiya, Wu and Bialek (2011); Bitar et al. (2012) ; Rajagopal et al. (2012) ; Nair, Adlakha and Wierman (2014) ). Meyn et al. (2010) study an electricity market equilibrium in the presence of renewable supply, and Bitar et al. (2012) analyze the optimal bidding strategies for renewable producers in the real time market. Kim and Powell (2011) study energy commitments made by renewable producers in presence of electrical storage, while Korpaas, Holen and Hildrum (2003) study scheduling and operation of storage for renewable energy producers in wholesale electricity markets. Varaiya, Wu and Bialek (2011); Rajagopal et al. (2012) ; Nair, Adlakha and Wierman (2014) study long-term contracts in the presence of renewable energy supplies. None of these works consider optimal pricing in electricity markets with renewable energy sources in the presence of forward contracts and (potentially correlated) incomplete information, nor do they discuss the neutralization of the MoE. The work closely related to ours is the recent independent paper by Ben-Moshe and Rubin (forthcoming), which also discusses the implications of diversified portfolios on the MoE. However, in their model MoE is not always present and their results are developed under the special case of linear inverse demand and quadratic costs (and without endogenous forward contracts or incomplete information). Most importantly, this paper does not contain our results on the full neutralization of the MoE and on the negative welfare effects of diversified energy portfolios.
Existence of MoE is empirically documented in detail in several electricity markets. For example, Sensfuß, Ragwitz and Genoese (2008) show that the increase in wind capacity in Germany has led to a decline in wholesale prices sufficient to offset the cost of subsidising wind. de Miera, del Río González and Vizcaíno (2008) found a similar result for Spain, but also point out that the industry's thermal capacity will need to adjust to the growth in wind power, and that the long-term equilibrium will be one in which all types of plants can cover their costs from wholesale prices. McConnella et al. (2013) calculate the reduction of wholesale prices through the MoE on the Australian national electricity market and show that policy incentives such as feed-in tariffs can produce an economic benefit-savings in wholesale electricity prices via the merit order effect. Similarly, Wurzburg, Labandeira and Linares (2013) analyze the size of MoE and show that the size varies depending on the region and the assessment method chosen. Finally, our analysis of forward contracts is related to the growing literature building on Allaz and Vila (1993) . Hughes and Kao (1997) demonstrate the importance of the public knowledge of the forward commitment. Green (1999) studies the role of forward contracts with linear supply functions, while Mahenc and Salanie (2004) focus on forward contracts in differentiated Bertrand competition in the spot market, the ability to sign forward contracts can reduce competition. Ferreira (2003) examines a context in which there are infinite forward contracting rounds and demonstrates that a kind of "folk-theorem" result can arise, supporting a range of equilibria. Liski and Montero (2006) demonstrate conditions in which repeated contracting can facilitate tacit collusion. Green and Coq (2010) argue that the risk of facilitating collusion is greatly reduced when the contracts are of longer term (i.e., cover several periods).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents general description of the model. Section 3 studies the effects of forward contracts. Section 4 presents the multi-stage oligopoly version of the model under presence of both forward contracts and incomplete information and correlated shocks capturing geographic proximity of renewable plants. Section 4.1 solves the model for a unique equilibrium. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 study price volatility. We conclude in Section 5. Derivations, proofs and extra results are found in Appendices.
MODEL
We start by analyzing the impact of diversification on the merit order effect without forward contracts and assuming complete information. Forward contracts and our full model incorporating both forward contracts and incomplete information will be introduced in the subsequent sections.
General Description
We consider an oligopolistic energy market consisting of producers that have a n ≥ 2 diverse energy portfolio, i.e., each producer can supply energy both from conventional thermal generators (that use gas or fuel) and renewable plants. More specifically, each producer owns a i generator that produces units of thermal energy at cost , where is a convex and differq C (q ) C i i entiable function. In addition to thermal energy, the economy also has a total of units of renewable R energy available at zero marginal cost. We assume that each producer owns a fraction of this d/n supply, where . Let denote the total amount of thermal energy produced by
the generators. The inverse demand (specifying the market price as a function of total supply) is given by , where is a differentiable function. P(Q + R) P Producers compete a la Cournot by choosing their thermal energy supply (they do not q i have a supply decision regarding renewable energy) to maximize their profits given by
We will look for a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of this game and refer to it as equilibrium for short.
In the next theorem, we present one of the main results of our paper, providing both some basic properties of the unique equilibrium and analyzing the effects of a more diversified portfolio for the producers. 
Theorem 1 (Merit Order Effect and Diversification) (i) Assume that the inverse demand function is strictly decreasing and concave. Then there exists a unique equilibrium such that the following
The first part of the theorem shows that the well-known merit order effect is present in our model and a greater supply of renewable energy reduces the market price. This can be seen as follows: a greater supply of renewable energy available at zero marginal cost has priority dispatch in supplying the demand and thus translates into a reduced residual demand to be fulfilled by thermal generators. Since this shifts prices along the supply curve, referred to as the merit order curve in energy economics literature, this effect is known as the merit order effect. The rest of the theorem shows that as producers become more diversified (meaning that they control a higher share of renewable energy), the merit order effect is weakened. Perhaps surprisingly, in the case when there is complete diversification (in particular, all of the available supply of renewable energy is owned by producers supplying thermal energy, captured by the parameter ) and the cost function is linear, d then the merit order effect is completely neutralized. In this case, an increase in supply of renewable energy has no impact on the market price.
The intuition for these results is instructive. As the degree of diversification increases, producers have an incentive to hold back their supply of thermal energy because they partially 6. Linear cost and linear demand are adopted as a good approximation to energy markets in several previous works, e.g. Allaz and Vila (1993) ; Bushnell (2007); Banal-Estanol and Micola (2009) .
7. Throughout, we take to be sufficiently large to ensure interior solution to the profit-maximization problem of α oligopolists.
internalize the reduction in profits that this will cause from renewables. When diversification is full, this internalization becomes complete and every unit increase in renewable supply causes a unit decrease in the equilibrium supply of thermal energy leaving total quantity of energy in the market fixed and thus completely neutralizing the merit order effect.
Linear Economy
We next illustrate the results of Theorem 1 by focusing on an economy with linear cost and linear inverse demand. 6 In particular, we assume the cost of production of thermal energy is given by , where is a scalar, and inverse demand function is given by
where and are scalars. 7 This allows us to provide an explicit
αϾ0 βϾ0 characterization of the equilibrium supply of producers and equilibrium price highlighting the dependence on total renewable energy and diversification .
R d
Theorem 2
The equilibrium supply of producer is given by i
and the equilibrium price satisfies
This result illustrates the main lessons from Theorem 1. For , the equilibrium price dϽ1 is a decreasing function of consistent with merit order effect. However and 2 ∂ p* ∂p* p* R Ͼ0 Ͼ ∂d∂R ∂d , highlighting that greater diversification increases prices by dulling the merit order effect. More-0 over, when , we can also see that . At the same time, , so that total thermal ∂p* ∂Q* d = 1 = 0 = -1 ∂R ∂R energy supply decreases one for one with the supply of renewables. This shows the full neutralization of merit order effect. This also explains why the linear cost is necessary for the full neutralization effect. Absent linear cost, even at , the supply of thermal energy does not decrease d = 1 one for one with renewable supply.
In the rest of the paper, in order to facilitate our study of forward contracts and incomplete information, we will focus on the linear economy introduced in this subsection.
8. In particular, a linear inverse demand equivalently corresponds to consumer utility of the form , and β 2 U(q) = αq -q 2 thus generates a consumer surplus of .
2
(α -p) U(q) -pq = 2β 9. This result also holds when we focus on equilibrium welfare relative to welfare in the corresponding competitive equilibrium. This relative welfare measure leads to identical results in the linear economy, since competitor welfare is independent of . d The negative welfare result can be further extended to an economy with an arbitrary concave and downward inverse demand function, i.e.,
, and convex and increasing cost function, i.e. , though in this case is more PЈϽ0,PЉ ≤ 0 CЈϾ0,CЉϾ0 natural to use the relative welfare measure. See the Online Appendix.
In the Online Appendix we also show the profit consequences of increasing renewables for diversified thermal producers (i.e.
) crucially depends on extent of . When thermal producers have a low share from renewables, i.e. is small, dϾ0 d d their profit decreases in . However, increasing is beneficial for therm, if their share from renewables is sufficiently high, R R i.e. is large. d
Welfare
We have so far seen that diversified energy portfolios neutralize the merit order effect and increase energy prices. Does this imply that such diversification can be welfare reducing? In this subsection, we show that diversified energy portfolios are indeed welfare-reducing. To simplify the exposition, we again focus on the linear economy (though the results in this subsection generalize straightforwardly to nonlinear demands and cost structures as we note below).
We define welfare in the usual fashion, as the sum of consumer and producer surplus. In the current context, this implies that it consists of the profits of thermal producers, the profits of renewable producers and consumer surplus.
8 Thus,
(total) Thermal producers surplus Renewable producers surplus Consumer surplus
The next theorem shows that greater diversification of energy portfolios always reduces equilibrium.
Theorem 3 is decreasing in . That is, greater diversification leads to lower welfare. W d
Intuitively, diversified energy portfolios are beneficial for thermal producers (as we show in the Online Appendix), but detrimental for consumers.
9 Since in this Cournot market, price is always above marginal cost, the negative effect on consumers resulting from higher markups dominates, and overall welfare declines with greater diversification.
FORWARD CONTRACTS
As noted in the Introduction, forward contracts often play a central role in energy markets. A natural question is therefore whether our neutralization effects are robust to the presence of forward contracts. In this section, we show that the full neutralization of merit order effect continues to hold with forward contracts.
Consider an economy with two dates and timing of events as follows: , producers make a decision on the amount of their thermal energy supply (and renewt = 2 able supply of is brought into the market). R
Figure 3: Timing of events.
Producer 's profit can be written as i f ff
where . Given the multistage nature of this game, we now look for a subgame p = α -β(Q + R) perfect Cournot-Nash equilibrium. In particular, taking as given the forward contracts signed at , at , we look for a Cournot-Nash equilibrium among the producers, and forward contracting t = 1 t = 2 decisions are made as a Nash equilibrium anticipating the subsequence Cournot stage.
As observed by Allaz and Vila (1993) 
It is then straightforward to compute the Cournot-Nash equilibrium given forward contracts summarized by as
Then, by backward induction, the (Cournot-Nash) equilibrium in the contract stage can be determined as the fixed point of the best response correspondences characterized by * * * * *
where is the total supply given the forward contracts
Theorem 4 There exists a unique subgame perfect Cournot-Nash equilibrium for the game with forward contracts. The equilibrium precommitted supply (forward quantity) of producer is given by i
i 2 (n + 1)β the equilibrium supply of producer is given by i
(n + 1)β n and the equilibrium price satisfies
The full neutralization of the merit order effect holds in this model, i.e., when , .
There are three results to highlight in this theorem. First, in the presence of forward contracts, the equilibrium price is lower compared to the case without forward contracts (in particular, in Eq. (4) is strictly lower than in Eq. (1)). This is because, as in Allaz and Vila (1993), p* p* forward contracts make each Cournot oligopolist act as a Stackelberg leader. In particular, each producer, by choosing to precommit to a quantity through a forward contract, forces the other producer to cut back its production in the production stage. Hence, for any value of , the equilib-R rium price declines because of this additional competition effect of forward contracts. Second, for , greater reduces the forward precommitments (i.e., in Eq. (2)). This is because, in * f dϽ1 R q i equilibrium, forward contracts are made at the equilibrium spot price, greater renewable energy supply reduces the spot price and the precommitments. This intuition also explains that is * f q i increasing in . A greater by partially neutralizing the merit order effect increases the equilibrium d d spot price, and through that channel, forward precommitments. Third, for the same intuition as in Theorem 2, when , the merit order effect is fully neutralized despite presence of forward d = 1 contracts.
CORRELATED SHOCKS AND INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
We have so far assumed that the amount of renewable energy is known both at the contracting stage and at the production stage, and we have also abstracted from the imperfect correlation in renewable supplies across different sites (e.g., across windfarms located in neighboring regions). In practice, there is considerable uncertainty about the extent of available renewable energy at any point in time, but it is generally recognized that the supplies are also correlated across various localities. Motivated by this, in this section, we consider our full model, which is an incomplete information competition setup where each producer chooses its thermal energy supply knowing its own available renewable energy but without knowing the realizations of other renewable supplies in the economy (and also still continues to enter into forward contracts). In particular, we modify our setup in the previous section by assuming that each producer owns fraction of a renewable d plant located in its region with random amount of available energy given by . We assume a R i general correlation structure among 's capturing the fact that available renewable energy has both R i a local and a global component (e.g., wind availability will be correlated in two nearby wind farms and less so for farms further away). unequal 's is important in our setting since it permits the presence of asymmetric equilibria, which is what we characterize j i,j as the correlation structure (network interactions) are not necessarily symmetric in our model. Formally, we assume each producer privately observes the available renewable energy i at local plant . We assume , where is a constant, and is normally distributed
with mean zero and variance , i.e., . The vector is assumed to be
jointly normal with covariance matrix given by and , for
, where . The scalar captures the correlation between available renewable energy 
we are in an independent value model.
10
The timing of events is the same as before except that uncertainty is realized after the contracting stage at and before the production stage at , as shown in Figure 4 . t = 1 t = 2 As in the previous section, the no-arbitrage condition will imply that forward contracts have to be at the expected market price, i.e., , where is the expectation
operator with respect to the random variable . Hence, producer 's (ex-post) profit is given by
where .
Equilibrium
Given the incomplete and multistage nature of this game, we focus on a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in linear strategies. In particular, producers choose the forward contracts at antict = 1 ipating the production decisions at and without knowledge of the parameters . At , given t = 2 h t = 2 i the forward contracts, each producer chooses its quantity knowing the realization of his own , h i but without knowing the other 's. Hence equilibrium forward quantity and supply is given by the h j fixed point of the below best response correspondences:
The next theorem is another one of the main results of the paper and provides a full characterization of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in this case.
Theorem 5 There exists a unique (pure strategy) perfect Bayesian equilibrium for the incomplete information game with forward contracts. The equilibrium forward quantity of producer is given i by
i 2 (n + 1)β 
and the equilibrium supply of producer (as a function of the parameter ) is given by
Remark 2 It follows from the preceding characterization of the equilibrium that in the independent
value model where for all , and, in the common value model
where for all , .
Even though the structure of equilibria becomes richer in the presence of incomplete information (and we will discuss some of the properties of this equilibrium in more detail below), the results on the impact of the renewable supply and the extent of diversification of producers mimics Theorems 2 and 4. When , a greater supply of renewables reduces expected equilibrium dϽ1 price due to merit order effect (and for the same reason as in Theorem 4, it reduces ), and greater * f q
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11. This is because is increasing in . 1 + d + j j 2 + j increases expected equilibrium price (and tends to increase ). In addition, when , the * f d q d = 1 neutralization of the merit order effect is complete and expected equilibrium price is independent of . R We can also observe the impact of private information on the quantity choices of proh i ducers. In particular, a higher reduces the quantity supplied because producer itself has access h i i to greater renewables and given the correlation across 's, also expects others to have greater h i renewables creating another force towards lower supply through the strategic substitutes effect in Cournot competition. It is the combination of these forces that make the coefficient in front of , h i , depend on both (the extent of diversification) and the correlation structure of 's as in Eq.
Example (duopoly with forward contracts and incomplete information) To highlight the effect of the correlation among the parameters on equilibrium, we focus on the special case with two h i producers. We assume , where is a parameter that scales inversely with the 2 Cov(h ,h ) = jσ j 1 2 distance among the renewable plants of the producers. Using Theorem 5, we have a unique perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium in linear strategies. The equilibrium supply of producer is given by i
where is the equilibrium of the same economy with complete information. The equilibrium price *
Intuitively, similar to the previous cases, at equilibrium, each producer cuts back on its thermal supply in response to an increase in the renewable supply (given by ) due to the strategic h i substitutes effect in Cournot competition. This reduction is modulated since renewable energy availability is now correlated among different plants (i.e., when my renewable energy is high, so is my competitor's) and this creates incentive for greater holding back.
11 Most interestingly, when , this modulation disappears and production becomes independent of . This is again an imd = 1 j plication of the neutralization of merit order effect. When , total production of each producer d = 1 (thermal + renewable) is independent of the parameter . Since his competitor's production is i h i independent of his private information, the correlation between their 's does not impact the proh ducer's supply decision.
Price volatility
The next proposition provides a characterization of price volatility and highlights its dependence on renewable share of producers and the correlation structure among parameters . This proposition shows that price volatility decreases when the share of producers from renewable supply increases, i.e.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium price volatility is given by
, and it disappears when . This is again due to the ∂Var(p) Ͻ0 d = 1 ∂d fact that when producers have full ownership of all renewable supply (i.e., ), the total supply d = 1 (via thermal and renewable sources) of each producer becomes independent of his type , vani h i ishing price volatility, i.e., when then .
Var(p) = 0 The following table summarizes the effect of diversification on the equilibrium price, price volatility and equilibrium forward quantity. 
We next investigate the impact of correlation structure among parameters on price h i volatility. Since correlation among 's captures correlation among renewable energy availability at h i different plants, our analysis reveals the effect of any kind of dependency, e.g. spatial configuration, of renewable plants on price volatility. We focus on regular configuration in the next section. Price volatility for non-regular structures is studied in Online Appendix.
Regular Configurations
We next focus on regular configurations, corresponding to a symmetric correlation structure for the renewable plants. This is defined formally through the covariance matrix of as follows. Var(p) = nσ β (1 + K). 
where is constant. Hence, greater correlation, i.e. , increases
, increasing volatility in the aggregate production. Thus, price volatility rises with increasing K) (see Appendix-Theorem 2 in the Online Appendix). K We next present two extreme cases of regular models and consider their implications on the market price volatility. Ring/Cycle Configuration This corresponds to a structure where renewable energy availability is correlated between two "neighboring" plants and correlation dies down quickly beyond that. We represent this by a circle network along which renewable plants are located. We assume that j = i,j 13. Given the definition of regular structures, for any -regular configuration with renewable plants, (n,2) k n KϽ cycle .
(n,k) ( n,n -1)
where is the decay factor and is the distance (in terms of number of hops
along the circle) between and . Hence the total correlation denoted by is given by
assuming that is an odd number. n
Complete Configuration This corresponds to a structure in which every renewable plant has the same correlation with all others, i.e., f ∈(0,1)
Comparison between these regular configurations immediately implies that K Ͻ cycle , and that any other regular configurations given and are in-between these two. Thus, K nf complete we have the following result directly followed by Proposition 2.
Proposition 3 Among all geographic configurations with regular structures, the maximum price volatility occurs when renewable plants have a ring structure and the minimum price volatility arises in geographic configurations exhibiting a complete structure.
As noted above, price volatility is decreasing in the correlations decay factor, . This is f because with a greater decay of correlation, there will be greater miscoordination across producers, contributing to price volatility. Since in the complete model each renewable plant is neighbor with all the other plants, misscoordination in supplies across competitors is lower than any other regular geographic configurations. The converse holds for the ring structures, where each renewable plant is neighbor with only two plants. Thus, the maximum price volatility occurs when renewable plants have a ring structure and the minimum price volatility arises in geographic configurations exhibiting a complete structure. Price volatility in any other regular configuration lies between these two polar cases. 
CONCLUSION
With mounting concerns over climate change caused by fossil fuels, there has been growing reliance on renewable energy. Many countries have responded by not only introducing renewable energy policy targets for the economy at large but imposing these on conventional energy companies. The hope has been to both reduce fossil fuel emissions and also benefit from renewable energy by offering lower prices to consumers through the merit order effect, which refers to the negative impact of renewables, typically supply that low marginal cost, on energy prices. This paper has studied the implications of diversified energy portfolios on equilibrium prices and the merit order effect in an oligopolistic energy market, and has suggested that the two aforementioned objectives of renewable energy policy may be contradictory. We have shown, in particular, that when thermal generators have a diverse energy portfolio, meaning that they also control some or all of renewable supplies, they offset the price declines due to the merit order effect because they strategically reduce their conventional energy supplies when renewable supply is high. In the limit case where all renewable supply is controlled by thermal power generators this offset is complete-meaning that the merit order effect is totally neutralized and renewable supplies have no impact on market prices. We also established that, through this neutralization of the merit order effect and the resulting higher markups, diversified energy portfolios are welfare-reducing.
These results are first derived in the baseline Cournot model oligopolistic competition. They are then extended to a setup with forward contracts and with incomplete information about imperfectly correlated shocks affecting renewable supplies across the general geographic landscape. In addition to showing the robustness of the partial and full neutralization of the merit order effect, we have used our general framework to study the implications of different calculations on price volatility.
